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Goethe University Frankfurt am Main
Abstract. This paper seeks to defend the thesis that a justification of morality 
has to underline the role of the second person in addition to a perpetual and 
on-going change of perspective that likewise includes the third and first person. 
To support this argument, the paper conceptualises responsibility as a  moral 
relationship whose core constitutes the encounter with the other whom we 
recognise as a second-person authority. It then sketches how this pre-cognitive 
dimension must be supplemented by a  cognitive insight which implies 
a dissociation from the second person and a consideration of third persons. on 
this basis, it finally provides an outline of how a possible tension between these 
different but all-together necessary perspectives could best be resolved.
In Anglo-American philosophy, the orientation towards the second-
person perspective is most prominently associated with Stephen Darwall 
and his book The Second-Person Standpoint,1 which is directed against 
the still dominant trend in this philosophical tradition of understanding 
morality either from a first-person perspective or from a third-person 
perspective.2 by contrast, associating morality essentially with the 
second person has a  longer tradition in continental philosophy due to 
1 Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability 
(Cambridge, mass.; london: Harvard university Press, 2006).
2 See, for example, Christine Korsgaard’s book on Self-Constitution (oxford; New 
York: oxford university Press, 2009) in which she develops the argument that morality 
is an  essential element of the subject’s self-constitution. As a  consequence, morality 
is associated with the first person. In contrast, utilitarians, for example, could be said 
to adopt a  third-person-perspective, since what counts as morally right can neither be 
settled by just looking at an ego nor an alter.
106 eVA buDDeberG
the influence of the phenomenological tradition and especially the face-
to-face encounter that is central to the work of emmanuel levinas.3
I agree with Darwall’s general strategy of seeking for the first principles 
of morality in the kind of a  relationship that pertains between myself 
and an other person who stands in a second-person relationship to me, 
that is, from the second-person standpoint or perspective; but I  think 
that this approach does not suffice to ground a full account of morality 
because what we need in order to be able to act in a morally responsible 
way is, I will argue, a perpetual and on-going change of perspective that 
also encompasses third persons and thereby the third and first-person 
perspectives. This perspectival extension is, on the one hand, necessary 
for developing an understanding of ourselves as thinking beings and for 
developing our capacity to act. on the other hand, we can only act in 
a morally responsible way if in our acting we not only consider the claims 
and interests of one single other, to whom we relate second-personally 
but also, at least potentially and at the background of our thinking, those 
of every other person who could be affected by our way of acting. Thus, 
it is not only essential for moral philosophy to emphasise the importance 
of the second-person perspective but also to deal with the very difficult 
question of how we can reconcile those additional perspectives that are 
all necessary for acting morally, that is, in a way that avoids regarding 
one perspective as absolute to the exclusion of the others.
In order to develop these thoughts in the following, I want to outline 
in a first step our moral relationship as one of responsibility to others 
whose core constitutes the encounter with the other whom we recognise 
in a pre-cognitive way. In a second step, I will describe very briefly how 
this pre-cognitive dimension must be complemented by a  cognitive 
insight which already implies a  dissociation from the second person 
and a consideration of third persons. In a final step, I will then provide 
a  sketch of how I  think a possible tension between these different but 
all-together necessary perspectives could best be resolved.4
3 See above all, his two most important works, emanuel levinas, Totality and Infinity 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne university Press, 1969), and Otherwise Than Being or Beyond 
Essence (The Hague, boston; london: martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981).
4 In this article I am drawing on arguments I develop in Verantwortung im Diskurs, 
(berlin, New York: Walter De Gruyter 2011). I would like to thank mahmoud bassiouni, 
manfred buddeberg, erin Cooper, Jörg Schaub and the reviewer of the European Journal 
of the Philosophy of Religion for helpful comments, as well as audiences at Prague and 
oxford where I was given the opportunity to present earlier drafts of this paper. I would 
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PreCoGNITIVe reCoGNITIoN AS THe bASIS 
oF morAl reSPoNSIbIlITY
I would like to start by elucidating briefly where, in my view, the ground 
of morality is to be found, namely, in a relationship with others that can 
be conceived of as a relationship of responsibility. responsibility, in the 
sense I have in mind here, is a constitutive part of intersubjective relations 
insofar as human beings share – principally through language – a world 
with others to whom they have to respond and to whom they could 
in principle give an account of the reasons for their actions.5 Through 
language people communicate with each other and thereby share how 
they experience each other and the world, and how they act and interact 
with each other and the world. It is only in a  common language that 
people have a (shared) world at all6 and it is largely by means of discursive 
exchanges that the world becomes meaningful for the communicating 
subjects. At the same time, by speaking about and of something, 
people address others and experience themselves as counterparts. For 
with every kind of linguistic interaction, more is implied than merely 
being a speaker, and it is not merely a question of ‘sentences’ that make 
assertions about the world. In every speech act, a person will always be 
addressed  – this is true not only for everyday-conversations, but also 
for speeches and literature when an abstract collective is addressed or 
even for soliloquy, treating one’s own self as a kind of inner audience. 
language has aside from – or even perhaps before – its communicative 
function, a phatic function through which the contact between speaker 
and addressee is realised or maintained.7 Thus, every speech act explicitly 
finally like to express my gratitude to the editors of the european Journal for Philosophy 
of religion, and those of this special issue, particularly Andrew Pinsent for his excellent 
editorial support.
5 In Verantwortung im Diskurs, I develop this conception of responsibility by way of 
discussing the work of Hans Jonas, Karl-otto Apel and emanuel levinas; it resembles 
Darwall’s general approach regarding the relation of moral obligation to accountability, 
which Darwall links with the very idea of a ‘second-personal reason’: the ‘kind of reason 
that simply wouldn’t exist but for the possibility of the second-personal address involved 
in claiming or demanding’. Second-Person Standpoint, p. 9.
6 See, maurice merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (london; New York: 
routledge Classics, 2002), p. 413.
7 Communication theory speaks of communication on the ‘Content and relationship 
levels’. (See, Paul Watzlawick, Janet beavin bavelas and Donn D. Jackson, Pragmatics of 
Human Communication. A  Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies, and Paradoxes 
(New York: Norton, 1967), pp. 51 ff.
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or implicitly presupposes an addressee, without whom it would be void 
and would not be conceivable.
Furthermore, to address someone presupposes at the same time 
that the addressed person could answer if he is adequately trained in 
the same language and not inhibited or unwilling to do so, and beyond 
that, that the addressee could respond to the claim raised to him both 
in terms of the issue being addressed and, ideally also, the intention 
behind the address. As linguistic beings, humans are always in a  state 
of potential to be addressed. Actualising this potential in second-person 
relations is largely how language first develops, and it is by means of 
language that human beings are able to construct and share a complex 
world with others, including with those third persons who are not 
present immediately to be addressed. but since human beings cannot 
avoid being addressed by others at will, they, by the same token, cannot 
refuse to respond (in the broadest sense of a reaction, even the reaction 
of willing not to respond in any overt way).8 For once persons are as 
addressees ‘affected by an addressing that makes a demand’,9 any act or 
behaviour following this address will refer, as bernard Waldenfels puts 
it, to this demand and is thus, nolens volens, a  response, regardless of 
whether it is positive or negative.10 even in the heat of a conflict, it is, as 
Christine Korsgaard points out,
[...] impossible to hear the words of a language you know as mere noise. 
In hearing your words as words, I acknowledge that you are someone. In 
acknowledging that I can hear them, I acknowledge that I am someone. 
If I listen to the argument at all, I have already admitted that each of us 
is someone.11
Speaking and acting can thus generally be described in terms of a response 
to others, a response that also always takes account of previous sequences 
of speech or action. In this sense, one can state that we human beings 
necessarily answer or respond. And in responding, we simultaneously 
recognise the other – a recognition I see as the very core of what could 
perhaps be described in Stephen Darwall’s vocabulary as the immediate 
8 See, merleau-Ponty, Phenomnology of Perception, p. 420.
9 ‘von einem An-spruch, einem Ansprechen, das einen Anspruch erhebt, getroffen‘, 
bernhard Waldenfels, Bruchlinien der Erfahrung. Phänomenologie, Psychoanalyse, 
Phänomenotechnik (Frankfurt/m.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2002), p. 127. my translation.
10 Ibid.
11 Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press, 1996), p. 143.
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ground of ‘the second-person authority’12  – the authority inherent in 
a person addressing us, simply in virtue of being a person. Just as we 
have to presuppose that every speech-act has an addressee, we must also 
assume that a human person only answers by responding to someone – 
to the message, the question, the expectation or actions – that an other 
person more or less explicitly directed at him. And people cannot – at least 
not completely – refuse to communicate with each other about the world 
which they share, since they thereby would lose or neglect an essential 
dimension of both the other person(s) and themselves. responsibility is 
essential, not accidental, to what it means for us to be human.
Recognition, in the sense I have in mind here, should be distinguished 
from cognition. In the philosophical tradition, the term ‘cognition’ often 
implies an  intentional ‘reaching out’ into the world and presupposes 
a form of consciousness which, in general, is able to cognise something 
as something or as a  person in a  certain role or function, with certain 
qualities, capacities, etc. In contrast, ‘recognition’ of the other describes 
an  immediate, non-intentional and unpremeditated insight we have 
as soon as we encounter other human beings. Therefore this form of 
recognition does not take into consideration specific features of our 
inter-subjective relations with others.13 Nevertheless the two modes of 
experience, cognition and recognition, different as they may be, constitute 
neither two different alternative relations to the world which mutually 
exclude each other, nor do they have two categorically distinguishable 
objects. We recognise the other person in that, at the same time we 
cognise him as a particular person by means of our sensual perception 
and our consciousness. only through the entanglement of these two 
modes of relating do we perceive human beings as human beings. besides 
cognition, recognition as grounding an attitude towards other humans is 
a concrete and common relation which is always present and constitutive 
of the way in which we exist in this world, and seems to be the essential 
way in which we encounter the other as a ‘second-person authority’.
This ‘second-person authority’ we have to recognise, being the very 
core of responsibility, needs further explanation and consideration. 
but let me first further explicate my argument that responsibility is 
to be regarded as a  fundamental anthropological determinant of our 
12 See, for example, Darwall, The Second-Person-Standpoint, pp. 126, 246, 320.
13 See, for example, Axel Honneth’s book on Reification and Recognition: A New Look 
at an Old Idea (oxford; New York: oxford university Press, 2008).
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being-in-the-world: Ideally, a  subject’s responses or reactions will 
harmonise with the suitably expressed and interpreted expectations of 
others. Whatever way the subject does respond, however, will evoke 
further reactions from others, and from these related interactions 
a  shared world emerges, being realised, structured and specified in 
one way or another by every answer given. like individual musicians 
contributing their notes to a  great, open-ended piece of music, and 
responding to the notes of others, no response given is truly ultimate.14 
others who are directly or indirectly affected by each contribution will 
respond to it, and these responses require further responses, and so on. 
every act and every form of behaviour can henceforth be understood 
as a  response to a  previous response, expanding the net of responses, 
and of responses to responses by means of which a world is constituted, 
structured, and ever renewed.
equally, responding and speaking also implies that one speaks 
about something. And in uttering this something humans claim, at least 
implicitly, that what is spoken can be explained and justified. For without 
any such claim, utterances would be devoid of meaning and without 
a  point; they could no longer be understood even in principle, and 
the speaker would be treated as aphasic if this practice were to happen 
constantly. every claim raised explicitly or implicitly can be put into 
question by others, and just as the claims raised with every act differ, they 
can also be put into question in various ways. Furthermore, as persons 
affected by such an  act, either as addressees or third-party observers, 
we may have and indeed express doubts about the appropriateness of 
the act in question. In such a case, the actor has to respond again and – 
according to the context – in different ways if he wants to uphold his 
claim that his act can be justified.
every utterance  – that is embedded in language, shared and co-
determined by others  – refers more or less directly or indirectly to 
previous utterances and can therefore also be described as a response to 
others, whether to words spoken just previously or in more temporally 
remote contexts. by the same token, human acts more generally can 
also be understood as a sequence in a nexus or network of interactions 
that can be interpreted as a response or reaction to acts preceding them. 
both speaking and acting are thereby closely interwoven: speaking is 
14 I would like to thank one of the reviewers for suggesting this illuminating metaphor 
to me.
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also acting, and acting being intentional can in principle be expressed 
in terms of reasons that in turn rely on language;15 both are realised in 
this world shared with others, and both share the claim, at least to some 
extent, to be understandable and, according to the context, justifiable.
The harmonisation achieved in this ‘game’ of acts and responses 
is, however, a matter of degree: in practice, the more that we find our 
interests and demands being considered in others’ speech and actions, 
the more easily we can accept those explicit or implicit claims as 
legitimate. Conversely, the less that others succeed in rendering their 
actions comprehensible and justifiable to us, the less those actions seem 
legitimate. All kinds of second-order considerations are also implicitly at 
play, such as the degree of justification that can be assigned to considering 
a demand as legitimate and so on. Collectively, all these demands and 
responses determine, structure and specify the relationship between 
people and, therefore, the communicative basis of a  world that can 
potentially be shared by everyone.
So far, I have argued that it is part of humans’ being-in-the-world that 
they are responsible to others. People cannot – or at least not completely – 
refuse to communicate with each other about the world that they share 
since they would thereby miss or neglect an essential dimension of both 
others and themselves. We cannot, therefore, even in principle choose 
whether we want to partake in the practice of responding and justifying.
but would it not be sufficient if people, driven by the endeavour 
to avoid isolation, justified themselves to others only insofar as it 
seemed necessary to them to achieve a degree of social interaction they 
subjectively find desirable? If, for example, someone feels obliged to 
justify his actions to his family but not to strangers, this seems at first 
glance compatible with the thesis that human beings are obliged to 
justify themselves to others because this is part of their being-in-the-
world. After all, this person does accept responsibility, though not for all 
others, but only for his family.
As I  see it, such a  restricted version of being responsible is not 
compatible with the thoughts presented so far, for it would then be, at 
best, a particular obligation to some others and not a moral duty to all 
others, even if everybody generally had to comply with it. What would be 
left unaccounted for by such a view is what characterises the relation to 
15 even if intentional action can in principle be described in terms of reasons, the 
subject of the action may not always be able to articulate these reasons himself.
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the other generally – that is, independently of the particular relationship 
between concrete persons.
For it is to be kept in mind what has been stated above about the 
very core of the responsibility-relationship, namely that the recognition 
of the other has to be regarded as entangled with but also distinct from 
any particular intersubjective relation involving cognition of something 
as some ‘thing’ or as the other person in a certain role or function, with 
certain qualities, capacities, etc. To recognise someone does not mean 
that we necessarily cognise him as our friend, business partner, enemy, or 
even as ‘the stranger’, but rather denotes the pre-cognitive way in which 
we are bound up with every other: becoming aware of the fact that the 
other concerns us does not depend on the other being in a particular – 
positive or negative – relation with us, or him being strange to us, so to 
speak, in a ‘neutral way’.
It is anything but easy to give everyday examples in order to illustrate 
this point. For almost always it could be argued that in every concrete 
case there exists a particular form of obligation, for example, stemming 
from social roles: a  person explains to his friend why he did not get 
back to him; a business partner justifies to his colleagues why he had to 
raise his prices, and so on. even in cases in which no personal relations 
apparently exist, such as, for instance, someone explaining to someone 
else, previously unknown to him and whom he encounters accidentally, 
why he demands something, mere convention might provide a  motif 
for the justification. Thus, in almost any situation one can imagine, it is 
difficult to distinguish clearly whether we respond to the other because we 
perceive ourselves to be responsible to him due to a particular relational 
obligation, or more generally, because we simply recognise him.
Nevertheless, I  am inclined to defend the idea that we have, 
independently of conventions or particular relationships, a general duty 
of responsibility towards other people simply because we recognise them. 
For even the rejection of an answer that is motivated by the conviction 
that our action is of no concern to the other implies that we have already 
conceded on the meta-level that, in general, the other has a right to ask for 
reasons and to expect a justification whenever our actions would indeed 
affect him.16 This right seems to me to be a moral right: we respond to 
16 According to Korsgaard, we do not need reasons to take into account others and 
their reasons: ‘We seem to need a reason not to. Certainly we do things because others 
want us to, ask us to, tell us to, all the time. We give each other the time and directions, 
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others and justify our actions to them not only or primarily for reasons 
that have to do with conventions, positive norms or the like, but because 
we simply recognise them.
That we recognise others is thus independent of the particular 
relationship in which we stand to them; what is even more, we cannot 
decide not to recognise someone17 without losing an essential dimension 
of what it means to be a  human being. This fundamental attitude of 
recognition has been summarised by Axel Honneth as ‘our active 
and constant assessment of the value that persons or things have in 
themselves’.18 We acknowledge another person not (only) in the form 
of a  cognitive judgment, and we initially do so independently of the 
question as to which particular person we cognise the other to be, and in 
which relation we may stand to that person, but we acknowledge him, so 
to speak, in his ‘second-person authority’.
reCoGNITIoN AND CoGNITIVe INSIGHT
moral responsibility is, as I have tried to make clear so far, inconceivable 
without the capacities of cognition and intentionality. beyond the  – 
mainly precognitive and non-intentional  – experience that others 
concern us in their second-person authority, moral responsibility 
implies moral insight (i.e. that we owe them answers and justifications) 
and such an  insight requires cognitive capacities.19 For the more 
distinctly and precisely this sensibility is articulated, the more manifest 
it becomes that the pre-cognitive relatedness to the other is accompanied 
by a cognising consciousness that puts us in a position to act and to take 
into account the particular claims that others have on us. In order to be 
open doors and step aside, warn each other of imminent perils large and small. We 
respond with the alacrity of obedient soldiers to telephones and doorbells and cries for 
help. You could say that it is because we want to be cooperative, but that is like saying 
that you understand my words because you want to be cooperative. It ignores the same 
essential point, which is that it is so hard not to.’ (Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 
pp. 141f.).
17 However, this capacity may be numbed or partly destroyed as, for example, Honneth 
has pointed out in Reification and Recognition.
18 See, ibid., p. 38.
19 See, martin Seel, ‘Anerkennung und Aufmerksamkeit. Über drei Quellen der 
Kritik’, in Sozialphilosophie und Kritik, ed. rainer Forst, martin Hartmann, rahel Jaeggi 
and martin Saar (Frankfurt/m.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2009), pp. 157-178, 162ff.
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able to act in accordance with the pre-cognitive recognition of the other, 
human beings need both a  conception of what answers, reasons and 
justifications are, and knowledge about the particular needs and rights 
that others legitimately possess due to the specific ways in which they 
are affected. Human beings can only do so by recognising the other, yet 
by the same token reflecting, and finally judging in which specific ways 
the other concerns them. Part and parcel of the moral insight is thus also 
this other dimension: the duty of responsibility is not, as rainer Forst 
emphasises, only ‘recognised’, but also ‘cognised’.20 Human beings must 
have a cognitive idea of how to do justice to the other if they want to 
respond to the other not just in any way, but rather in the most morally 
adequate way.
There are at least three aspects with regards to which cognition needs 
to supplement the ‘sensed’ insight upon which the responsibility to the 
other is based: First, the pre-cognitive recognition of the other has to be 
reflected upon, so that this experience can guide future action even in 
situations in which we otherwise might not correspond to it spontaneously. 
Second, cognition is required so that we can understand, on the basis of 
a  fundamental recognition of the other, the demands addressed to us, 
weigh them and judge them in line with standards of justice. Finally, 
cognition comes into play in generalising and thereby in transferring 
this fundamental experience of a concrete encounter with one singular 
other to all conceivable others  – without having encountered each of 
them personally. To recognise others presupposes personal encounters, 
or to put it slightly different, to encounter others in their second-person 
authority – we hereby become aware that we have to respond to them. 
but even in situations in which we do not encounter other human beings 
personally, we are able to think of ourselves as being responsible to them 
because we can and should, by a process of generalisation made possible 
by reason, transfer this recognition to all of them, just because we can 
encounter them in principle. This generalisation implies a shift from the 
second-person relation to one that includes others as third persons.
Pre-cognitive or non-intentional relatedness to the other (the 
recognition of the other) and the cognition of the duty of responsibility as 
well as the knowledge of the aptness and the possibility of universalisation 
20 rainer Forst, ‘moral Autonomy and the Autonomy of morality. Toward a Theory of 
Normativity after Kant’, in The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory 
of Justice (New York: Columbia university Press, 2007), pp. 43-61, 54.
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are thus inherently linked.21 These processes are interdependent on the 
level of action, and therefore cannot be hierarchically ranked. We would 
not even reasonably think about how to respond adequately to others 
and their demands if we had not already recognised that these others 
concern us. Conversely, recognition without reason-guided reflection 
that, in turn, is instructed by the encounter with the other, would easily 
become a catchword without commitment. Thus, I agree with the general 
approach of Darwall’s argument that we draw from second-person 
relatedness to ground the foundations of morality: the core of morality is 
neither a general law nor a relation to myself, but consists rather in our 
(finding ourselves as) being involved with the respective other human 
being we have to recognise. We cannot, however, adequately think about 
how to act in a morally responsible way without taking into account that 
this other is always already surrounded by others, third persons, whom 
we also have to recognise and take into account.
Nevertheless, even in those cases in which we not only have to respond 
to the singular other, but also to anyone who is one step further removed 
from us, moral responsibility is still in fact about concrete other human 
beings, for also ‘all the others’ – as levinas puts it – ‘that obsess me in 
the other do not affect me as examples of the same genus united with my 
neighbour by resemblance or common nature’.22 They concern us, since 
they are all of them, each in his unique alterity, concrete others – and 
hence potentially second-person authorities, even if not present to us in 
a second-personal way at the moment of concern. In contrast to Kantian 
approaches to morality that start from the universality of the moral 
law and then subsume individual cases under this law, the experience 
with the concrete individual person is here transferred to every other 
person, because he is ‘an other’ too. It is thus not a question of living up 
to an abstract principle, but of taking into account the other human in 
the concrete peculiarity of his being human. Thus, the core of morality 
is not a general law, but the willingness to relate second-personally with 
another human being.
At this point in the argument, my more anthropological thesis on 
responsibility with which I began has been extended to a statement about 
moral philosophy: human beings recognise in the encounter with the 
other – independent of every particular relation and in a non-intentional 
21 See the respective thesis in levinas, Otherwise Than Being, p. 159.
22 Ibid.
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way  – that this other concerns them, and thereby they acknowledge 
at the same time that they have to respond to this other, or that they 
owe this other reasons. Not recognising or cognising that the other has 
such a fundamental ‘right to justification’ – as rainer Forst phrases this 
core moral insight – would mean to deny him and oneself an essential 
dimension of what it means for a human to be in the world: namely, to be 
a creature that shares through language a world with others – a sharing 
that requires that one gives others justifications for one’s actions by being 
prepared to provide adequate reasons for them.
ACTING reSPoNSIblY, 
ADJuDICATING DIFFereNT PerSPeCTIVeS
If the core of morality is not a general law but the willingness to relate 
second-personally to another human being, in the concrete peculiarity 
of his being human, how can we avoid the risk of immediate second-
person relatedness obscuring broader moral concerns? I would like to 
emphasise at least three aspects that seem important to me: the necessity 
of an  intersubjectively valid measure, that is, justice; the possibility of 
bracketing one’s own perspectives in order to take other perspectives into 
account; and finally verbal communication with others.
First, in the discourses of justification pertaining to the exercise of 
moral responsibility, a  comparison between various particular claims 
is assumed that includes both the claims of other persons and one’s 
own claims. In order to evaluate and decide which of them must be 
considered and to what degree, an  intersubjectively valid measure is 
required – justice. This central concept of practical philosophy as well 
as of everyday life, however, is often regarded as being both unclear and 
complex and, moreover, it varies according to the context of application. 
but at the core of a generally shared basic understanding, the concept of 
justice is related at a minimum to the attributes of impartiality,23 balanced 
23 rainer Forst, Contexts of Justice, XI; see also, for example, Stefan Gosepath, Gleiche 
Gerechtigkeit: Grundlagen eines liberalen Egalitarismus (Frankfurt/main: Suhrkamp, 
2004), pp.  36ff.; otfried Höffe, Politische Gerechtigkeit: Grundlegung einer kritischen 
Philosophie von Recht und Staat. Erweiterte Neuausgabe (Frankfurt/main: Suhrkamp, 
2002), pp. 43f.
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judgment24 and authority25 in judging or, rephrased in a negative sense, 
to the avoidance of arbitrariness.26
Any exercise of moral responsibility, committed to justice in this 
sense, should therefore transcend the different subjective standpoints 
and claims, as well as the reasons brought forth to defend them, judging 
from a superordinate perspective that takes account of the claims of all 
persons concerned. Those persons must on the one hand be treated as 
morally equal, but at the same time the extent to which they are concerned 
by an action must be taken into account. A just evaluation of claims and 
resulting actions has to consider with equal weight the different contexts 
(which also implies a reiterative change of perspectives) in which such 
claims and actions and therefore also their various respective modes 
of justification can be seen. The kind of context in which an  action 
occurs is neither an objective fact nor arbitrarily determinable. often, 
the context is clear, or at least clear enough for moral evaluation, and is 
only put into question if the evaluation of an action and the claims that 
have to be considered turn out to be problematic. Nonetheless, every 
action is subject to a moral principle of justification insofar as, in every 
situation, every person can in principle demand justifications and this 
demand can only be rejected with good reasons. At a minimum, every 
actor in a social context must be at least potentially able to justify why 
in any particular case he does not justify his action.27 Thus no one can 
be rightfully exempted from this kind of obligation; hence I argued in 
the first sections of this paper that we as human beings are potentially 
concerned with all other human beings, each of whom already affects us 
as soon as we encounter him. based on that general provision, human 
beings are additionally obliged to justify their actions to particular others 
according to the respective context and particular relations.
In ordinary life, actions are seldom or never completely justified 
explicitly in detail since the appropriate consideration of all claims 
and interests hardly ever succeeds, but it is possible to speak of 
24 Forst, Contexts of Justice, p. XI.
25 Ibid.
26 Forst, The Right to Justification, p. 2.
27 As an extreme example, consider for instance the response given to a prisoner by 
a guard at Auschwitz, which at least took the form of a minimal justification of why he 
did not justify his action, ‘Hier gibt es kein Warum’ (‘Here there is no why’). See Primo 
levi, If This is a Man: The Truce (london: Abacus, 2007), p. 35. I would like to thank one 
of the reviewers for providing this addendum.
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a  gradual realisation of such justice. Actions are all the more just the 
more comprehensively they could in principle be justified to all those 
concerned with or affected by them. Therefore, it is not possible to 
determine in advance what is just in individual cases,28 but it has to be 
ascertained in discourses of justification, which have to be pursued each 
time anew. Hence, on the level of application, responsibility and justice 
are closely entangled: Whereas responsible acting demands that people 
justify their actions with reasons while taking into account others, their 
claims and their interests, justice is the measure by which the relevance 
of the different claims is evaluated in a discourse of justification. Here 
the third-person perspective, once it emerges, is definitely dominant, 
although the basic moral reason underpinning this perspective is still 
second-person authority. For no action can be just if the actor does not 
conceive himself as responsible in principle to every particular other 
affected by his actions. on the other hand, in order to be capable of 
responding and thus to act responsibly at all he has to disregard particular 
interests, at least temporarily.
This consideration leads me to the second point I  want to spell 
out briefly, namely that persons should be able to step back from the 
immediacy of situations and temporarily refrain from judging so that they 
can weigh different, possibly conflicting or competing, claims against 
one another. every actor certainly always remains bound to his own 
perspective. As a person in the world, however, he is not only reacting 
to the external stimuli of what is immediately present to him, but he 
also possesses the capacity to reflect upon his actions and thus to step 
away from his own perspective. Furthermore, every person has, given 
his different social roles and the very fact that he lives in different and 
changing contexts, various subjective perspectives and, at the same time, 
the capacity to switch from one to the other. In order to act responsibly 
with respect to others, persons must have developed this capacity 
sufficiently for intermittent dissociation such that they are able to adopt 
the perspectives of others provisionally in addition to their own. beyond 
this capacity, they must also be capable of bracketing these perspectives 
in order to be able to evaluate the situation from a  superordinate 
28 This does not mean that general laws such as ‘murder is generally unjust’ are not 
valid, generally. but there may be extreme situations, in which killing seems to be the best 
and also the most legitimate of all the bad alternatives (it is, however, an open question if 
we should describe such actions nonetheless as ‘murder’).
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standpoint that is intersubjectively shared most broadly among those 
influenced by a particular action.
Nevertheless, the final perspective referred to here should not be 
interpreted as adopting the position of a  ‘neutral observer’, since such 
an observer simply judges ‘in the light of his own individual understanding 
of the world and of himself ’,29 instead of as a result of communication 
with others. moreover, in order to minimise the risk of being caught up 
in one’s own views about how to adjudicate between the claims of others 
‘paternalistically’, communications to appropriate the perspectives 
of others would, I  suggest, need to be as direct as possible. The aim 
ought to be the attainment of an  intersubjectively shared perspective, 
or at least one with some aspects that are apt for reaching consensus.30 
(This process may also be described as a kind of mediation between the 
second and third-person perspective.) From such an  intersubjectively 
shared perspective, the standpoints that have to be considered can be 
more easily evaluated impartially since all relevant others have their 
say and judge the (relative) legitimacy of the particular claims together. 
It is also possible to qualify one’s own position so that a compromise, 
a conciliation, or even better an agreement, can be attained even in cases 
of clashes of interests that seem prima facie irreconcilable.
Not only is cognitive understanding important in this process, but also 
considering ‘that the normative claims of other subjects can be appraised 
in terms of their moral weight only if at the same time the particular 
views [...] are also understood’.31 For in order to actually understand 
what kind of ‘value a particular interest has for a concrete person’, it is 
equally necessary ‘to comprehend his individual life ideals and modes of 
orientation’.32 This requires, beyond the cognitive role-adoption, ‘a certain 
degree of reciprocal empathy’.33 What is implied by empathy is inter alia 
the person’s willingness to temporarily suspend the affective evaluation 
of his own claims and interests. by linguistic means or by specific modes 
29 Jürgen Habermas, ‘remarks on Discourse ethics’, in Justification and Application 
(Cambridge, massachusetts; london, england: mIT Press, 1994), pp. 19-111, 48.
30 See also Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1990), p. 146; Habermas, ‘remarks on Discourse ethics’, p. 48.
31 Axel Honneth, ‘The other of Justice: Habermas and the ethical Challenge of 
Postmodernism’, in The Cambridge Companion to Habermas, ed. Stephen K. White 
(Cambridge, england: Cambridge university Press, 1995), pp. 289-323.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., p. 303.
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of speaking that emphasise the merely thetic character of his assertions, 
as well as by means of certain registers of speech that implicitly ‘bracket’ 
their validity, a person can indeed present his claims, from a first-person 
perspective, in a  suspended or provisional way. With the help of such 
relativising gestures, the person indicates that he distances himself from 
his own claims and, as a consequence, can more openly defer to those of 
others. If all participants are able and willing to bracket their own claims, 
this (provisional) relativisation of their own perspectives will result, it is 
hoped, in better mutual understanding.
Nevertheless, the attempt at weighing and evaluating interests 
provisionally, impersonally and without an  immediate pressure to act 
does not preclude an eventual failure. Three cases seem to be of special 
relevance: a) a lack of rational reflection (for instance, if we in principle 
care more about our own interests and reasons without justifying this 
prioritisation); b) a  lack of empathy (if we are not willing or able to 
understand the perspectives, thoughts, feelings and reasons of others 
because we are too committed to our own and take them to be ‘objectively 
correct’); c) a lack of pragmatism and an inability to reduce complexity 
(if we do not succeed in balancing the different perspectives in a way that 
allows us to reach a judgement on which we can then act).
Finally there is a  third aspect to emphasise: the importance of 
communicative interaction. In order to justify his actions to others 
possibly concerned by them, the person has to integrate these actions 
with their claims according to norms which are recognised by – ideally – 
all persons concerned as valid and appropriate to the situation. For this 
purpose, he has to demonstrate in his conversation with these others 
a willingness to reveal the motives and aims of his actions, so that they 
can come to understand them. For only in communicating with others 
is it possible for him to decide the extent to which his behaviour may 
affect the interests and lives of others.34 by the same token, the acting 
subject himself can explain his motives and intentions and so on, 
allowing others to obtain a better understanding of his actions. moreover 
the subject learns about others’ attitudes toward his actions and what 
34 For Hans-Georg Gadamer, it is part of every true conversation ‘that each person 
opens himself to the other, truly accepts his point of view as valid and transposes himself 
into the other to such an extent that he understands not the particular individual but 
what he says’ (Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (london; New York: Continuum, 
1975), p. 387).
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possible consequences (intended or otherwise) they might have which 
should be considered in future actions. Thus verbal communication 
should, however, be understood as always accompanying, sustaining 
and penetrating human actions35 both beforehand as well as during 
subsequent communication.
even in situations in which reaching an  understanding is really 
intended, it is often not possible to obtain an agreement or some sort 
of an acceptable compromise. For often people are only insufficiently or 
not at all capable of articulating their own claims, needs or attitudes in 
a way that is comprehensible to others. on the contrary, they often find 
it difficult to engage with others’ statements, and a willingness to include 
the interests of others as comprehensively as possible in one’s own action 
cannot be taken as self-evident. So it is possible that differences cannot be 
overcome for these or for other reasons. In such cases, it is only possible 
to search for compromises acceptable for all participants or for situations 
of mutual avoidance in which justifications are no longer necessary.
Verbal communication is certainly always imperfect and therefore 
also somehow insufficient; this begs the question, however, of what 
alternatives are at our disposal to include others as peacefully and 
equitably as possible in our actions. For language implies the idea of 
understanding36 and understanding conversely requires language. 
even where we speak of a  ‘wordless’ understanding, this occurrence is 
interpreted as a ‘wordless language’ or reflected in a meta-conversation. 
Thus language in any mode or shape is essential for the mediation of 
positions as well as for critique or doubts. Different modes of verbal 
communication, however, should be distinguished which are not equally 
suitable to maintaining or promoting responsible acting.37 moreover, 
the specific performance of understanding is also very much dependent 
35 See for the concept of communicative action, besides Jürgen Habermas, Theory 
of Communicative Action, also his article ‘moral Consciousness and Communicative 
Action’.
36 See for the concept of verbal communication, Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 443.
37 The form of language in which understanding is explicitly the aim is argumentative 
discourse as Karl-otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas have described it. They presuppose 
that the very structure of communication allows for nothing else but the stronger 
argument and excludes any kind of coercion. Admittedly, this is an ideal construction 
which in reality is never realised in this form. Nevertheless, we presuppose in every real 
situation of discussion, indeed in every communication, as a regulative idea that peaceful 
understanding might be possible. Cf. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1: 
Reason and the Rationalization of Society (london: Heinemann, 1984), p. 25.
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upon the context in which it takes place because the claims to be provided 
at various times call for different forms of communication.38
based on this last point, I would like to add a brief social observation. 
I suggest that one of the reasons why modern societies are so tension-
filled and difficult is that more and more human actions may affect future 
generations with whom a real communication is impossible. likewise, 
a direct dialogue – where we encounter others in their second-person 
authority  – rarely takes place with people in distant continents who 
suffer from environmental and other damage originating in wealthy 
or industrialised regions. but that does not mean that under these 
conditions no mode of communication is possible and reasonable. For 
one thing, with modern means of communication, the potential for better 
information flow, as well as for visual and hence face-to-face, as well as 
oral-aural communication at a distance, has been greatly enhanced. In 
addition, language, due to its inherent capacity for adopting attitudes, 
also allows for a  fictional communication with imaginary partners of 
dialogue and the anticipation of, in principle, an unlimited number of 
objections. What is important, however, is that the hypothetical status of 
those dialogues should be kept in mind and that they always must remain 
open to corrections and revisions resulting from real communication 
with the others.39
In summary, verbal communication with others, the bracketing of 
one’s own perspective and the endeavour to appropriate the perspectives 
of others, as well as justice conceived as a  discourse of justification, 
38 For instance, while in the legal realm arguments should hold priority due to their 
assumed aspiration to pertain as generally and as emotionally neutral as possible, other 
forms of communication have their place in private relations, since much broader ethical 
claims are at stake which also include the consideration of feelings and moods. Hereby the 
question of in which context we have to justify ourselves and which linguistic form should 
therefore be adequate can be interpreted and answered differently depending on the 
perspective. Seyla benhabib, for example, underlies that ‘situations’ cannot be described 
as ‘envelopes and golden finches [...] nor like apples ripe for grading’ (‘The Generalized 
and Concrete other’, in Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in 
Contemporary Ethics (Cambridge, england: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 148-177 (p. 163)).
39 It may be a very interesting subject for further investigation whether some forms 
of religion may assist this process of second-person-commitment, as Andrew Pinsent 
has pointed out in a commentary to this paragraph. He suggests that in the generic sense 
such communication reflects the possible social origins of the term ‘religion’ from ‘to 
re-connect’ (religare), combined with a  certain reverence and obligation to the other 
(religio).
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have all been developed here as three aspects of the exercise of moral 
responsibility. As I have tried to point out, however, these three correlate 
inherently with one another: for a  just consideration of all those who 
are concerned with an  action, the bracketing of one’s own claims and 
the consideration of the claims of others is always necessary, and we 
have the best access to those claims by including these others as directly 
as possible by means of verbal communication. In all of these three 
aspects, first-, second- and third-person perspectives are entangled. 
Whereas in justice the third-person perspective is usually regarded as 
predominant, especially when expressed in the form of moral laws, true 
justice is grounded ultimately on second-person relatedness, qualified 
by the fact that concrete human situations in practice require the 
ability to change perspectives. moreover, the second and third-person 
perspectives are closely interrelated, to the extent that we could not 
imagine communicating about different claims and needs without the 
recognition and cognition of the other, even one who is not present, as 
a second-person authority.
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